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I. INTRODUCTION
According to recent studies, approximately eighty-nine percent of stu-
dents have heard the word "gay" used frequently in school in a negative way
and more than seventy-two percent reported hearing other homophobic re-
marks (for example, "dyke" or "faggot") in school and online. Casual use of
antigay rhetoric does not make it any less devastating. This verbal aggres-
sion, including saying "that's so gay" 2 in a critical way and wearing t-shirts
* Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow and Ph.D. candidate, Columbia University, De-
partment of Sociology; Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Har-
vard Law School; A.B., magna cum laude, Harvard College. A version of this paper
was delivered at the Missouri Law Review Symposium on Cyberbullying on February
9, 2012, and at a lecture at New York University School of Law in Fall 2012. Thanks
to Professors Douglas Abrams and Christina Wells of the University of Missouri
School of Law and the entire Missouri Law Review, particularly Ian Larson, for or-
ganizing the Cyberbullying symposium and inviting me to speak. Special thanks to
co-panelists Professors Barry McDonald and Lyrissa Lidsky for their keen insights.
1. JOSEPH G. KosciW ET AL., GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK,
THE 2009 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS 16, 26 (2010).
http://glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENATTACHMENTS/file/000/001/1 675-2.pdf
[hereinafter GLSEN 2009].
2. See e.g., Sylvia Wood, What Kids Hear on the School Playground: "You're
so Gay!", MSNBC (Jan. 18, 2012), http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/01/18
/101 82679-what-kids-hear-on-the-school-playground-youre-so-gay.
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that read, "Be Happy, Not Gay,"3 starts early 4 and follows gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, transgender, and questioning (LGBT)5 students from elementary
through high school, and from school into cyberspace. For example, despite
Facebook's best efforts to silence hate in accordance with its Statement of
Rights and Responsibilities,6 the popular online social network has had its
share of antigay hate groups: "Keep Queers Out of America," "STOP
AIDS!!!!! KILL GAYS AN [sic] NIGGERS!!!!!!!!!," "people who hate
fags," "GAY ? news flash : we fuckin' hate you !!," and "Kill All Gays," to
name just a few.7
This hate does not always target a particular individual and, therefore,
does not look like the traditional face-to-face aggression8 that plagues schools
and pushes teens to suicide. But the prevalence of this behavior, the ease
with which it condemns an entire identity group, and its effects - particularly
on those who hear it, on those who identify as gay, and on the school as a
whole - merit disciplinary consideration from the school. Elsewhere, I have
discussed the affirmative steps schools can take to improve school climate
3. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 670
(7th Cir. 2008).
4. GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, PLAYGROUNDS AND
PREJUDICE: ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CLIMATE IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (2012),
http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN ATTACHMENTS/file/000/002/2027-
1.pdf (reporting on bullying and gender issues in the elementary school setting).
5. The abbreviation LGBT includes "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender" indi-
viduals; however, I will use the acronym to refer to those sexual minorities as well as
those youths questioning their sexual orientation.
6. Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Sept. 1, 2012). For example,
paragraph 3, section 7 requires users to commit that they "will not post content that: is
hate speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or
graphic or gratuitous violence." Id.
7. David Badash, Facebook or Hate Book?, THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Badash, Facebook or Hate Book?],
http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/facebook-or-hate-
book/discrimination/2010/03/09/8699. Some of these sites were quickly taken down,
but not before garnering large followings. Id.; David Badash, Facebook or Hate
Book? Facebook Shuts Down Anti-Gay Hate Groups!, THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (Mar. 9, 2010), http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/facebook-or-hate-
book-facebook-shuts-down-anti-gay-hate-groups/successes/2010/03/09/8828.
8. 1 use the term "aggression" to capture both single-incident attacks and re-
peated bullying in accordance with my argument for distinguishing between the two
for the purposes of the First Amendment, as set forth in previous scholarship. See Ari
Ezra Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705 (2012) [here-
inafter Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments].
9. See, e.g., RYAN'S STORY, www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org (last visited Sept. 1,
2012); see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
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and prevent these attacks from happening in the first place. I have also ar-
gued that determining a school's disciplinary authority over cyberattacks
requires us to distinguish between single incident peer-to-peer aggression and
repeated bullying. 1 In this Article, I tackle a special subset of face-to-face
aggressors and cyberaggressors - the identity-based aggressor - and argue
that identity harassment is a unique and peculiarly harmful form of social
aggression and, therefore, school discipline of identity-based aggressors is
consistent with student First Amendment rights.
Identity-based aggressors highlight a quality intrinsic to someone's per-
sonhoodl2 and demean it, deprive it of value, and use it as a weapon. They
attack women,13 racial minorities, 14 religious minorities,' and other tradition-
ally victimized groups. And, as such, they attack not only their particular
victims but also their victims' communities. Identity-based aggressors com-
mit a constitutional evil not only because their behavior interferes with vic-
tims' access to education, their liberty to express who they are, and their right
to participate in our body politic, but also because aggressors perpetuate the
legitimacy of a malodorous social stigma attached to any given minority.16
They may not create, but undoubtedly foster the continued encumbrance of
minority identity with social and political burdens that keep minorities at risk
of discrimination, social marginalization, and the tacit acquiescence to harm
that comes with being different. And, although any of those effects may
merit lawful school discipline under the "substantial disruption" standard of
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, most federal courts con-
10. Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L.
REV. 385, 387 (2012) [hereinafter Waldman, Tormented].
11. See generally Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, supra note 8.
12. I am purposely avoiding the term "immutable," which, though the current
raison d'etre of legal suspect classifications, see, e.g., Vamrnum v. Brieri, 763 N.W.2d
862, 887-88 (Iowa 2009) (collecting cases), is neither a necessary nor an internally
coherent way of determining the reach of constitutional protection for a specific
group. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
76-105 (1999).
13. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 63-67
(2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights].
14. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty., 218 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir.
2000).
15. Corilyn Shropshire, Facebook Wrestles with Anti-Semitism, HouSTON
CHRONICLE (May 15, 2009), http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/2009
4739992/facebook-wrestles-with-anti-semitism-social-site-t.html.
16. Although this Article focuses only on identity-based bullying in schools, I do
not discount the possibility that identity-based harassment outside the school may also
be a constitutional evil under certain circumstances, say, when such harassment is
associated with the workplace. See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0,
71 MD. L. REv. 655, 663-64 (2012).
17. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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fronted with peer-to-peer aggression cases miss the consistent rationale for
restricting student speech that underlies Tinker and its three supposed excep-
tions carved out in Bethel School District v. Fraser,18 Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier,19 and Morse v. Frederick.20
Many courts tend to consider single incidents of identity-based aggres-
sion insufficiently disruptive to restrict under Tinker, and sufficiently distinct
from lewd speech, official speech, and drug-related speech to restrict under
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, respectively. 21 But that viewpoint misses the
forest for the trees. If Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse depart from Tinker for
special types of student speech, they do not depart from the underlying,
broader rationale that the reason we restrict certain student speech is because
of the effects that speech has on something - on the teacher or her ability to
teach; on the administrator or her ability to function in her official capacity;
on the school, or its reputation, success, standards of classroom discipline, or
curricular mission; and, of course, on classroom discipline. This is what I
will refer to as the "effects test." And, a broadly defined effects test makes
sense, especially when those effects conflict with both modern liberal educa-
tional values that see schools as pristine "marketplaces of ideas" and classical
Aristotelian values that see schools as training grounds for civic participation
and perfection. Identity-based aggression is an affront to both because it
takes the personal effects of peer-to-peer harassment and compounds it, me-
tastasizing its impact over broad populations and creating an environment
where teachers cannot teach, students cannot learn, and free speech means
nothing. Therefore, under any measure, a school may lawfully restrict it.
This Article answers two categories of questions, one social and another
legal. The first series of questions is about the sociology of identity aggres-
sion and it seeks to determine whether there is a difference between, say,
calling someone a "faggot" and calling someone a "dork." If there is a differ-
ence, to what extent is there empirical evidence that suggests that one is more
harmful to the victim, to his community, and to his school? The legal prob-
lem flows directly from the relative harm posed by identity aggression: it is
too simplistic to see the Court's student speech jurisprudence like a pie with
discrete bites taken out. Rather, the consistency lays in the common core of
18. 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that schools can censor a student's lewd
speech at an assembly even when the speech does not contribute to a substantial dis-
ruption).
19. 484 U.S. 260, 270-72 (1988) (finding that speech that bears the imprimatur
of the school, like an official newspaper created as part of a journalism curriculum,
may be censored without meeting the Tinker standard).
20. 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (holding that a school can restrict speech that can
reasonably be construed as encouraging illegal drug use).
21. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216-17 (3d. Cir.
2001) (finding school anti-harassment policy was too broad where it covered speech
that intended to cause a disruption; plaintiffs were students who wanted to speak
against homosexuality).
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concern - namely, the school's ability to teach its curriculum. If that is true,
and if calling someone a "faggot" has demonstrably more negative effects on
that core of concern, then regulating identity aggression in schools should be
a simple matter. To this end, this Article proposes a normative way of under-
standing the Supreme Court's student speech jurisprudence based on an ef-
fects test, which is the consistent rationale underlying the Court's student
speech cases. School discipline of identity-based aggressors is consistent
with that effects test and retains fidelity to the liberal and classical values
running through American public education. Part II defines identity-based
aggression in greater detail as attacks on an intrinsic personal characteristic
that is salient to a person's or group's identity. This definition relies on cur-
rent psychological evidence and my own sociological studies. In Part III, I
describe the unique harms of identity-based aggression by comparing them to
traditional face-to-face aggression. I argue that identity-based aggression
devalues personhood, which in turn wreaks particular devastation on a
school's and community's social fabric. This damage is exponentially com-
pounded when the identity-based aggression occurs online. Part IV situates
those harms within the Supreme Court's student speech doctrine. Tinker and
its supposed exceptions are linked by a consistent effects test that bases the
constitutionality of school discipline of student speech on some measure of
the speech's effects on the school environment. To this end, I argue that the
Court's student speech jurisprudence since Tinker should not be seen, as is
the conventional wisdom, as a single test and three exceptions, but rather as
an imperfect elucidation of one flexible balancing test that assesses the value
of the speech versus its impact on the school's ability to teach. Because iden-
tity-based aggression irreparably damages the school by harming its reputa-
tion and its ability to teach, restricting identity-based aggression makes sense
within this framework. Finally, Part V shows how this proposal is consistent
with both the liberal and classical educational values that run through Tinker,
Fraser, Kuhimeier, and Morse, further suggesting the proposal's mainstream
appeal.
II. IDENTITY-BASED AGGRESSION AS AN ATTACK ON PERSONHOOD
Identity-based harassment is not a new concept, but recent media,22 leg-
islative,23 executive,24 and judicial25 attention on bullying in schools and its
22. See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal
Jump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion
/30suicide.html? r-1.
23. Forty-nine states have enacted some form of anti-bullying legislation, see
BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012), with
New Jersey's and Massachusetts's considered the strongest. Emily Bazelon, Bullies
Beware, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252543/; Matt Friedman,
N.J. Gov. Christie Approves Toughest Anti-Bullying Law in the Country, NJ.COM
2012] 657
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attendant suicides has highlighted a wide gap in the current understanding of
the nature, effects, and implication of such aggression.26 For the purposes of
this Article, I synthesized current law and social science research and sup-
plemented the work of others with my own surveys of students and identified
the best definition of identity-based aggression as aggression based on a
core, identifying characteristic that is essential to someone's conception of
personhood. This formulation has at least three advantages. First, it is con-
sistent with sociological and psychological studies about aggression and har-
assment in schools and mirrors current student understanding. Second, it
parallels federal law's understanding of the concept, thus making a First
Amendment analysis applicable in context. Third, by eschewing artificially
formal requirements like immutability, this definition accurately reflects the
underlying rationale for legal protections for traditionally disadvantaged or
unpopular groups.
The Department of Children, Schools, and Families (DCSF) in the
United Kingdom's Department for Education has been studying identity-
based aggression for years,27 and experts at the University of London's Unit
for School and Family Studies recently released a comprehensive study with
recommendations for how public schools can address racist, sexist, homo-
phobic, transphobic, and other types of identity-based harassment.28 From
these studies, a definitional pattern emerges: the characteristic attacked by an
identity-based aggressor is at the center of a minority's group identity.29
(Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/201 1/01/njgov christie approves
tough.html.
24. See, e.g., Ame Duncan, Sec'y of Educ., We Will Not Fail our Children (Sept.
21, 2011), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/we-will-not-fail-our-
children.
25. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 572 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified
Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
26. Warren Blumenfeld at the University of Iowa is one of the few social scien-
tists researching cyberbullying of gay school children, but even his work has so far
declined to establish a single definition for identity-based bullying. See Warren J.
Blumenfeld & R.M. Cooper, LGBT and Allied Youth Responses to Cyberbullying:
Policy Implications, 3 INT'L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 114, 118-19 (2010),
http://www.freireproject.org/images/2321/IJCPv3_7.pdf.
27. The DCSF published its most recent series of reports based on broad sample
sets in British schools since 2006. RoSIE GREEN ET AL., DEP'T FOR EDUC.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF BULLYING VICTIMS IN SCHOOLS (2010),
http://www.education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/DFE-RBOO1.pdf.
28. See generally NEIL TIPPETT FT AL., EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO IDENTITY-BASED BULLYING AMONG
LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND WALES (2010),
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded-files/research/64_identitybased bull
ying.pdf.
29. See, e.g., id. at 18.
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Someone's race, ethnicity, culture, faith, disability, sexual orientation, gen-
der, or gender expression can provide fodder for identity-based aggression
because these attributes are so closely identified with an individual's sense of
belonging; 30 whereas, a particular political view, an avowed dislike for Ma-
donna's music, or a hatred of football are not, thus distinguishing between
core characteristics and personal opinions.
All types of identity-based aggression have a similar origin: the desire to
perpetuate a perceived dominance of one group over another. For example,
racist aggression excludes, marginalizes, denigrates, and devalues victims
because of their color, ethnicity, or culture.31 Antigay aggression, or what
some social scientists call "homophobic bullying," is aggression based on real
or perceived sexual orientation or nonconformity to sexual behavioral
norms.32 Similarly, sexist aggression is aggression "based on sexist attitudes
that, when expressed, demean, intimidate or harm another person because of
their sex or gender."33 These types of aggression - racist, homophobic, and
sexist aggression - result from the same underlying assumption that a given
minority is of less value than, or subordinate to, a traditional majority or ad-
vantaged group. Once again, this definition distinguishes core characteristics
from personal opinions: those Americans who dislike football may be a mi-
nority, 34 but the football-loving population does not perceive them as weak,
unworthy, or valueless.
A definition that focuses on core, identifying characteristics essential to
personhood also conforms to our current legal understanding of identity-
based aggression. For example, in Harper v. Poway Unified School Dis-
trict,35 the Ninth Circuit defined identity-based harassment as "[s]peech that
attacks . . . students who are members of minority groups that have histori-
cally been oppressed . . . and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and in-
timidate them, as well as to damage their sense of security."36 And, in Nuxoll
30. Id. at 18, 25, 32, 38, 43.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 32. (citing DEPT. FOR EDUC., PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO
HOMOPHOBIC BULLYING IN SCHOOLS (2007)).
33. Id. at 38 (citing DEPT. FOR EDUC, GUIDANCE FOR SCHOOLS ON PREVENTING
AND RESPONDING TO SEXIST, SEXUAL AND TRANSPHOBIC BULLYING 5 (2009)).
34. Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans Are Fans of Pro Football Than Any Other
Sport, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1786/more-americans-
fans-pro-football-than-any-other-sport.aspx.
35. 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). This case,
discussed at length infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text, concerned school dis-
cipline of a student who wore a t-shirt to school that read, "BE ASHAMED, OUR
SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front, and
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" on the back. Id at 1171.
36. Id at 1178. The court found that public school students have a right to be
free of "verbal assaults on the basis of a core identifying characteristic such as race,
religion, or sexual orientation" while in school. Id.
2012] 659
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ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School District #204,37 the Seventh Circuit
had no qualms with the school's harassment policy that prohibited "(1) de-
rogatory comments on (2) unalterable to otherwise deeply rooted personal
characteristics"38 because traits like race, sex, and sexual orientation "are
major components of ... personal identity" and hurtful comments about such
characteristics "can strike a person at the core of [one's] being." 39 Both
courts found that what is unique about profound identifying traits is the ca-
pacity of harassment on the basis of those traits to irreparably damage the
victim, his associated group, and the school as a whole. This idea also makes
sense in the context of our broader civil rights jurisprudence about racial and
sexual minorities in schools. To condemn blacks and gays with racist or big-
oted expressions or t-shirts "is to say, necessarily, that [blacks,] gays and
lesbians are shameful" and are inferior,40 and as the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Brown v. Board of Education,41 a "sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn." 42
The same is true even if the aggressor claims he is only criticizing gay
conduct or a "gay lifestyle," not gays as a class. After all, the distinction
between condemning a group and criticizing the uniquely identifying behav-
iors of its members is, as the Court has stated many times, artificial and false.
In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, for example, the Court found
that a "tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews." 43 And, in Lawrence v.
Texas," the Court saw anti-sodomy statutes as mere proxies for condemna-
tion of gays as a class, noting that when "homosexual conduct is made crimi-
nal ..., [the] declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination." 45 More recently, the Ninth Circuit saw Proposi-
tion 8's restriction on marriage recognition for gays in the same way:
It will not do to say that Proposition 8 was intended only to disap-
prove of same-sex marriage, rather than to pass judgment on same-
sex couples as people. ... [T]he elimination of the right to use the
official designation of "marriage" for the relationships of commit-
37. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008). Discussed in depth infra notes 178-81 and
accompanying text, this case involved a student who wore a t-shirt with the slogan,
"Be Happy, Not Gay," to school. Id. at 670.
38. Id. at 671 (emphasis in original removed).
39. Id.
40. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1181.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
44. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
45. Id. at 575. See also id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("While it is true
that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is
closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is
targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.").
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ted same-sex couples send[s] a message that gays and lesbians are
of lesser worth as a class - that they enjoy a lesser societal status.4
These examples suggest that Justice Ginsburg was right in Christian Le-
gal Society v. Martinez47 when she said that the Court does not make the arti-
ficial distinction "between status and conduct," 48 and, more importantly, that
the federal courts have recognized the profound connection between a per-
son's sexual orientation and his conception of personhood. State restrictions
on his right to live a free and unencumbered life as a gay person, whether
through anti-sodomy laws or bans on marriage recognition for gays, are not
just affronts to him, but also to all those like him because homosexuality is a
core, identifying characteristic.
Current law not only recognizes core, identifying characteristics that are
essential to someone's conception of personhood, it also understands the dis-
tinction between attacks on those traits and statements of opinion on other
less defining characteristics that make up the totality of a person's identity. A
t-shirt that states, "Homosexuality is Shameful" or "Be Ashamed, Our School
Embraced What God Has Condemned," 49 is qualitatively different than one
that states, "Young Democrats Suck" or "Madonna Sucks." The latter slo-
gans may not be polite or civil, but they cannot be sufficiently damaging to an
individual, a group, or a school because they do not attack an identifying
characteristic. Conservative critics would interject, noting that what is salient
or defining to one person may not be so important to another; the oft-used
phrase, "I am not defined by my..." followed by a particular infirmity, sexu-
ality, or disability comes to mind. What is more, sexual orientation has long
been subject to debate over its immutability, a factor traditionally seen as
important in the race context, such that some could legitimately believe that
antigay aggression could not be as harmful as racist aggression because the
fixed immutability of race is what makes it a defining, core characteristic.
However, that reasoning misses the point. What makes characteristics like
race, gender, or sexual orientation core, defining characteristics that merit
protection from attack is neither their salience alone nor their immutability,
but rather the burden society places on those groups as holders of certain
traits.
This theory highlights the third, and most important, reason why our
definition of identity-based aggression makes sense: it is consistent with the
fact that federal law creates protected classes based on some identifying char-
acteristics and not others because of the burden society places on certain
46. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012).
47. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
48. Id. at 2990 ("Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and
conduct in this context.").
49. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
50. See RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 37.
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groups based on their identity. The standard for a determining a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, for example, is well known: we consider (1) a history of
discrimination, (2) whether the group's distinguishing characteristic affects
its members' ability to contribute to society, (3) the group's defining charac-
teristic, and (4) whether the group could realize its equal rights through the
political process alone.52 But, these are not hard and fast rules to be applied
formally; their purpose is to find examples where state action reflects preju-
dice or mere disapproval of an unpopular group rather than a rational connec-
tion to a legitimate goal. Suspect classes cannot be majorities or historically
advantaged groups because such groups can never, and have never been, vic-
timized in the voting booth; they cannot be holders of passing opinions about
politics, society, music, or any other non-important characteristic; nor can
they be minorities in name only, without social stigma attached. Although
some like to abbreviate the third requirement to "immutability," that would be
incorrect 4 and, in any event, it is not the most important factor.55 Also ir-
51. See id. at 36-37.
52. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 983 (N.D. Cal.
2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-15409 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2012); In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,
427-28 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 887-88 (Iowa 2009);
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606-07 (Md. 2007); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138
P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006).
53. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) ("Several formulations might
explain our treatment of certain classifications as 'suspect.' Some classifications are
more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rational-
ity in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice
is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each
person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law.
Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal.
Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically been 'rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process.' The experience of our Nation has
shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups. Our re-
sponse to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste'
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
54. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concur-
ring) (finding that the prong of suspectness inquiry is satisfied when the identifying
trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to
penalize a person for refusing to change [it]"); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442
("Because a person's sexual orientation is.so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is
not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation
in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.").
55. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 ("It bears emphasis, however, that the United
States Supreme Court has placed far greater weight - indeed, it invariably has placed
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relevant is that women make up more than fifty percent of the population, that
some traditionalists cling to the discredited view that homosexuality is a
choice, and that minorities exercise their political power through lobbying
groups. Those facts do not make women, gays, or blacks any less disadvan-
taged as groups.
There is more to being a suspect class than being a minority; suspect
status is minority status caused by prejudice, popular disapproval, or histori-
cal disapprobation of the group's particular defining characteristic. As Pro-
fessor David Richards explains, suspect classes are not regarded as victims of
prejudice neither because they are fewer in number nor incapable of changing
their identity, but rather "because the prejudice itself assigns intrinsically
unreasonable weight to and burdens on identifications that define one's moral
personality."56
Race, gender, and sexual orientation are encumbered by an extrinsic and
"impersonal script"57 that makes them core, defining characteristics of par-
ticular minorities in American society. In other words, irrational and debili-
tating stereotypes that have ballooned from personally held prejudices to gov-
erning social construct turn the stereotyped victims into suspect classes.
Prejudiced southern whites perceived black people as indolent, thus requiring
a strict slavery or caste system, and that historical disapprobation imbued
58being black in America with an automatic handicap. A norm of masculinity
has long associated womanhood with emotion and weakness, thus justifying
defined "male" and "female" roles in society and levying an automatic disad-
vantage on anyone, male or female, who deviates from those social norms.59
And, homophobic heterosexuals perceive gay men as feminine and weak (or
lesbians as masculine and angry), thus encumbering all gay persons with the
stigma of noncomformity.6
dispositive weight - on the first two factors, that is, whether the group has been the
subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and whether the group's distin-
guishing characteristic bears no relation to the ability of the group members to per-
form or function in society. In circumstances in which a group has been subject to
such discrimination and its distinguishing characteristic does not bear any relation to
such ability, the court inevitably has employed heightened scrutiny in reviewing statu-
tory classifications targeting those groups.").
56. RICHARDS, supra note 12, at 41.
57. Id. at 77.
58. See, e.g., Lee Sigelman & Steven A. Tuch, Metastereotypes: Blacks' Percep-
tions of Whites' Stereotypes ofBlacks, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 87, 88-89 (1997).
59. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY
MEN AND CLASS MATTER 77-108 (2010); SHAUNTI FELDHAHN, THE MALE FACTOR:
THE UNWRITTEN RULES, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SECRET BELIEFS OF MEN IN THE
WORKPLACE 86 (2009).
60. See Francisco J. Sanchez et al., Reported Effects of Masculine Ideals on Gay
Men, 10 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 73, 74 (2009).
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The Oregon Court of Appeals took this position in Tanner v. Oregon
Health Sciences University, where the court recognized that minorities
should be protected based on their suspect status because of the societal bur-
dens placed upon them.62 In Tanner, the court upheld the right of a state uni-
versity's gay employee to extend her health benefits to her domestic partner,63
in part, because it considered gays to be a suspect class. It was not because
of any one factor or the immutability of Ms. Tanner's sexual orientation;
rather, the court based its reasoning on the burdens society places on gays and
lesbians as a class:
[T]he focus of suspect class definition is not necessarily the immu-
tability of the common, class-defining characteristics, but instead
the fact that such characteristics are historically regarded as defin-
ing distinct, socially-recognized groups that have been the subject
of adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice.65
A core, identifying characteristic may be immutable, but it need not be;
it may be a deeply held conception of the self. It is also more than that. Iden-
tity-based aggressors find a core, identifying characteristic that has been im-
bued with social stigma and use that stigma as a sword against their victim's
safety and identity. In this way, our definition conforms to the underlying
rationale for Constitutional protections for minority groups.
III. IDENTITY-BASED AGGRESSION AND TRADITIONAL PEER-TO-PEER
AGGRESSION COMPARED
That identity-based aggression shares some common ground with tradi-
tional peer-to-peer aggression is unsurprising; the former is a subset of the
latter.66 Although the two forms of aggression mirror the accepted definition
among social scientists, and although both are made worse when the aggres-
sion occurs online, identity-based aggression gives rise to unique and particu-
larly devastating harms beyond the effects of other types of aggression.
These outsized effects - on the victim's community, the school environment,
and society as a whole - help make school discipline of identity-based ag-
gression consistent with First Amendment principles and educational values.
61. 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
62. Id at 447.
63. Id at 437.
64. Id at 447.
65. Id at 446.
66. Identity-based aggression can also run from teacher-to-student or student-to-
teacher, but that is a further subset within the identity-based aggression class. This
Article focuses only on peer-to-peer identity-based aggression in schools.
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A. Definitional Similarities
The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) defines tra-
ditional bullying as aggression that (1) "occurs repeatedly over time," (2) is
"intended to harm or disturb," and (3) flows from "an imbalance of power,
with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful one." The
asymmetry of power is traditionally physical (e.g., an athletic student versus a
less-physically developed victim) or psychological (e.g., high self-esteem
68
versus low self-esteem). The bullying can occur "verbal[ly] (i.e., name
calling, threats, taunting, "malicious teasing"), physical[ly] (e.g., hitting,
kicking, . . . taking personal belongings), or psychological[ly] (e.g., spreading
rumors, engaging in social exclusion . . . ).6 JAMA's definition is consistent
with that from the Department of Justice, which describes bullying as "in-
volv[ing] a real or perceived imbalance of power, with the more powerful
child or group attacking those who are less powerful."70
My definitions of identity-based aggression and traditional peer-to-peer
aggression maintain fidelity with JAMA's definition. Though true bullying
requires repetition, both identity-based and traditional aggression can come in
single-incident - what I have called "attacks" or "cyberattacks" when they
occur online7' - or in a repeated form. An aggressor can mock a victim's
weight or appearance once or do so repeatedly; she can also upload a single "I
Hate" video 72 to YouTube or use her victim's Facebook page to repeatedly
taunt and abuse her victim.73 Similarly, an identity-based aggressor can wear
a Confederate flag t-shirt to school once or send one antigay text; he can also
regularly wear racist t-shirts, create racist Facebook groups to taunt racial
minorities, or verbally and physically abuse him for years.
67. Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among US Youth: Prevalence and
Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2094, 2094
(2001),
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/citizensecurity/eeuu/documents/bullying.pdf
6 8. Id.
69. Id.
70. NELS ERICSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP FACT SHEET: ADDRESSING THE
PROBLEM OF JUVENILE BULLYING 1 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl
/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf.
71. Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, supra note 8, at 709.
72. An "I Hate" video is a video in which one speaker faces a camera and lists all
the things he or she hates. In this context, "I Hate" videos are usually all about one
victim.
73. Uploading a single "I Hate" video onto YouTube could be considered re-
peated behavior given the permanence of digital uploads. That is, even though an
aggressor created a single video, that video will be available forever, compounding
the harm to the victim over the years.
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Identity-based and traditional aggressors both intend to harm their vic-
tims, and employ similar tactics to obtain this result.74 Assaulting or directly
insulting a victim may be the paradigmatic types of harm evidencing intent,
but aggression is not limited to those injuries. As the definition makes clear,
bullying can involve excluding someone from a group or asking peers to vote
on the relative "ugliness" or "wimpiness" of a student.75 This is called indi-
rect bullying,76 and it comes from a similar desire to harm the excluded or
victimized individual. Pranks at the expense of a victim for the purposes of
humiliating the victim or entertaining an aggressor's peers also seem to fit the
definition of bullying, even though the bully thought what he was doing was
funny. However, it is not clear the same could be said of a prankster who
thought his victim would laugh off his humiliation. The distinction between
the jovial and the malicious prank may be determined in context through the
aggressor's statements or other behavior or through the third part of the defi-
nition of bullying - namely, an imbalance of power.77
Indeed, both identity-based and traditional aggressors require an imbal-
ance of power. In the traditional model, a high status student - a popular
athlete, for example - can tease another high status student, whereas he is
more likely to bully a low status or weaker student who has few friends.78
Weakness can be based on any number of asymmetries, with physical
strength only representing the most noticeable paradigm. Minority status
causes a significant asymmetry in power, especially where the particular mi-
nority is the subject of ridicule, bigotry, and hatred outside the school. This
asymmetry gives rise to identity-based aggression. It should come as no sur-
prise then that young members of the gay and lesbian community are
uniquely susceptible to bullying and its tragic consequences. They are bullied
74. Nansel, supra note 67, at 2094.
75. Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 26, at 119. Or, perhaps, the "Ugly Meter"
iPhone application, which uses facial recognition software to tell someone how ugly
he or she is, can be fodder for such bullying. See Rosemary Black & Lindsay Goldw-
ert, 'Ugly Meter' iPhone App May Be Hurtful to Kids and Fodder for Bullies, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 20, 2010), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-
20/entertainment/27078743_1 app-new-iphone-facial-recognition.
76. Dan Olweus, Annotation: Bullying at School: Basic Facts and Effects of a
School Based Intervention Program, 3 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1171, 1173
(1994).
77. Nansel, supra note 67, at 2094.
78. Ken Rigby & Phillip Slee, Children's Attitudes Toward Victims, in
UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING BULLYING 119 (Delwyn Tattum ed.,1993); see also
Marilyn Langevin, Helping Children Deal with Teasing and Bullying: For Parents,
Teachers, and Other Adults, INT'L STUTTERING Ass'N.,
http://www.stutterisa.org/CDRomProject/teasing/tease bully.html (last visited Sept.
8, 2012) (stating that one key element of bullying is a power imbalance and that bul-
lying can be a one-time event).
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because they are perceived as deviating from the norm;79 because they are, in
the case of adolescent gay boys, perceived as less likely to be physically
strong; and because antigay bullying is, in some communities, either tacitly
or explicitly condoned by antigay bigotry in society at large.
B. The Sociology ofIdentity-Based Aggression
Given these definitional similarities, the determinants and effects of tra-
ditional and identity-based aggression should, at a minimum, overlap. In-
deed, current research confirms as much. All aggressors target victims of
lower status, whether defined by social and economic status, physical stature,
or ethnic, racial, or sexual identity. ' Yet, despite recent interest in bullying
as a social phenomenon, we lack the necessary data on the social determi-
nants of identity-based bullying. My own preliminary survey of high school
students at one California school revealed the obvious - that net of other fac-
tors, the odds of being a victim of identity harassment increases by more than
a multiple of four when that victim identifies as LGBT82 - and the not so
obvious - that students of all grades, backgrounds, genders, and interests feel
that identity harassment is more damaging than any other kind of aggres-
sion.83 But, this is only the beginning of some much-needed quantitative re-
79. See, e.g., Anthony R. D'Augelli et al., Childhood Gender Atypicality, Vic-
timization, and PTSD Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 21 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1462, 1467-69 (2006) (discussing results of a study evi-
dencing that LGB youth, at an early age, felt they were "different from other youth"
and were pointed out as being so by their peers).
80. See id. at 1472 (noting that males who were viewed as less masculine experi-
enced significantly more verbal sexual orientation victimization than other males).
81. See Nansel, supra note 67, at 2098.
82. Survey, High Tech High School, San Diego, California (Dec. 3, 2010). I
reported this data, along with a summary of the findings, to an assembly of the facul-
ties of the various High Tech High schools in San Diego, California on January 18,
2011. Participants (n = 366, 12 grade = 70, 11"' grade = 92, 1 0 th grade = 93; 9 th
grade = 109; 2 did not identify their grade) were high school students between the
ages of 14 and 18. Overall, 54 identified as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender or were
questioning their sexuality. In addition, 180 identified as male (49.1 percent), 181
identified as female (49.5 percent) and 5 did not identify their gender. Using ordinal
logit regression analysis, the odds ratio for the relationship between victimization by
identity aggression and LGBT identification was 5.23, with ap-value of 0.00, indicat-
ing statistical significance.
83. Id. Students were asked, "Do you think that bullying someone because of his
or her identity, like using words like 'faggot' or the n-word is worse or no worse than
bullying someone because of any other reason?" More than 87 percent of students
answered in the affirmative and there were no statistically significant determinants of
that group of students. Topline comparison data also indicated that all demographics
of students agreed that identity bullying is worse than other kinds of bullying. These
conclusions are not definitive: the sample size is too small and the focus on one avail-
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search on identity bullying; I will report my current work, which extends this
research, in the coming months.
We do know that bullying victims experience various negative out-
comes, ranging from withdrawal from school activities8 and increased Inter-
net use to the exclusion of face-to-face interaction with others" and depres-
sion.86 Even a single attack at school or a single incident of cyberattacking is
associated with increased daily anxiety and depression at school.87
Identity-based aggression piles on three additional - and devastating -
effects that make such behavior even more anathematic to a modem school.
First, attacks on core, defining characteristics "silence members of targeted
groups". Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Helen Norton recount the
story of Bonnie Jouhari, a civil rights advocate and mother of a biracial child,
who was targeted on a white supremacist website for being a "race traitor."89
The website pictured Ms. Jouhari's workplace exploding, gave bomb-making
instructions, and showed a hooded Klansman holding a noose near the threat
that race traitors are "hung from the neck from the nearest tree." 90 And, there
are students like Jamie Nabozny, a Wisconsin boy who was verbally, emo-
tionally, and physically harassed for being gay for four years until he required
hospitalization, attempted suicide, and switched schools.91 He was hit, spit
on, victimized by mock rape, attacked from behind in a restroom, kicked by
able school may have biased the data despite the diversity of the school. My current
research focuses on expanding this analysis.
84. NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 47 (2007).
8 5. Id.
86. See Susan M. Swearer et al., "You're So Gay! ": Do Different Forms of Bul-
lying Matter for Adolescent Males?, 37 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 160, 170 (2008) (dis-
cussing the negative impact of bullying on young homosexuals, particularly its spur-
ring "constriction" of interpersonal connections).
87. See Adrienne Nishina & Jaana Juvonen, Daily Reports of Witnessing and
Experiencing Peer Harassment in Middle School, 76 CHILD DEv. 435, 444 (2005)
(measuring anxiety, humiliation, school dislike, and anger as negative effects of peer
harassment); Michele L. Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated
Distress Related to Internet Harassment: Findings From the Second Youth Internet
Survey, 118 PEDIATRICS 1169, 1172 (2006) (reporting that thirty-eight percent of
youth were distressed by a single incident of harassment); Michele L. Ybarra, Link-
ages Between Depressive Symptomatology and Internet Harassment Among Young
Regular Internet Users, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAv. 247, 252 (2004) (discussing
depressive symptomatology as "significantly related to the report of online harass-
ment").
88. Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:
Fostering Digital Citizenship for our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1448
(2011) [hereinafter Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech].
89. Id. at 1450.
90. Id.
91. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
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bullies in the hallways, and constantly berated with homophobic epithets. 92
Identity-based aggression victims like Ms. Jouhari and Jamie do not just bear
physical and emotional wounds, they also retreat from society. Ms. Jouhari
and her daughter moved five times to avoid being found by white suprema-
cists93 and Jamie stopped participating in school, then stopped attending
school, and finally moved to a neighboring state to avoid his torment. 94 Ho-
mophobic threats targeted Jamie not qua Jamie, but qua member of the gay
community, and, therefore, those threats could silence the entire gay commu-
nity in Jamie's school. After all, if one of your own is being victimized for a
trait you share, you have reason to hide: from who you really are, from oth-
ers, and from attention.
This cause-and-effect relationship between identity-based aggression
and the silencing of the victimized group is well established. Countless
commentators, from Richard Delgado and David Yun95 to Charles Law-
92. Id. at 451. Jamie's classmates regularly referred to him as a "faggot," and
physically assaulted him. Id. The harassment and the principal's refusal to take any
disciplinary action against the offending students made Jamie "petrified" to attend
school. Id. In eighth grade, Jamie was assaulted in a boys' bathroom, and again,
school officials took no action. Id. The bullying intensified to the point that a district
attorney advised Jamie to take time off from school. Id. After the ten days off, the
harassment resumed, leading Jamie to attempt suicide. Id. at 451-52. After a stint in
the hospital, Jamie finished the year at a Catholic school. Id. at 452. In ninth grade,
he was struck from behind while using a urinal, causing him to fall and allowing an-
other student to urinate on him. Id. Continued bullying resulted in another try at
suicide, another hospital stay, and a runaway attempt. Id. "Students on the bus regu-
larly [spouted] epithets, such as 'fag' and 'queer,"' at Jamie and threw steel nuts and
bolts at him. Id. While waiting for the school library to open, Jamie was attacked by
eight students. Id. One student led the charge, kicking Jamie in the stomach for about
five or ten minutes while the other students looked on in amusement. Id. A few
weeks later, Jamie collapsed from internal bleeding. Id. By the next year, Jamie left
school, enrolled in a school in Minneapolis, and was ultimately diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder resulting from years of being bullied. Id. Perhaps the most
tragic feature of Jamie's story is the inexplicable refusal of any school official to do
anything about the harassment and their flagrant endorsement of the behavior. Id.
(after reporting the attack by the eight boys, the official in charge of discipline
"laughed and told [Jamie] that [Jamie] deserved such treatment because he is gay.").
See Waldman, Tormented, supra note 10, at 392-93.
93. Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1450
n.89 (citing DeWayne Wickham, They Suffer for Doing Right Thing, USA TODAY,
May 16, 2000).
94. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451-52.
95. See Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against
Hate-Speech Regulation - Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1822-23 (1994), cited in Citron & Norton, Intermediaries
and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1448 n.74.
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rence96 and Steven Shiffrin,97 have documented the connection between racist
aggression and a chilling effect on minority speech. Racist speech tends to
"preempt[]" minority speech,98 either out of fear of reprisal or in response to
the subtle damning pressure to fit in, thus creating a "repressive environ-
ment" 99 where only the majority's voice is heard. That kind of environment
is utterly incongruous with academic success and a school's educational mis-
sion. Participating in class is essential for learning,'" and isolation in the
halls, lunchrooms, and on playing fields deprives victims of "personal inter-
communication among the students" that "is not only an inevitable part ... of
attending school[,]" but also "an important part of the educational process."
01
Identity-based aggression has the unique ability to chill participation by par-
ticular victims of harassment and all other students that identify with those
victims. In this way, man students silence themselves, causing their grades
and test scores to suffer,10 and ultimately, causing the school and society to
suffer.
Second, identity-based aggression conveys a message of unworthiness,
stigmatizing an entire group of people as valueless. This message not only
encourages others to join in the aggression, but it instills self-hatred within
victimized groups who are constantly reminded of their lower social status.
Professor Shiffrin provides a non-exhaustive list of harms caused by racist
speech that applies universally to antigay, misogynist, transphobic, and other
identity-based speech:
[I]t is an assault on the dignity of people of color; it humiliates and
causes emotional distress, sometimes with physical manifestations;
it helps spread racial prejudice, not only stigmatizing people of
color in the eyes of the societally dominant race, but also in the
eyes of the victims themselves, inspiring self-hatred, isolation, and
96. Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 (1990), cited in Citron & Norton, In-
termediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1448 n.74.
97. Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning
ofAmerica, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 86 (1994), cited in Citron & Norton, Intermedi-
aries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1448 n.74; see also, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2332 (1989) ("Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement
all hit the gut of those in the target group.").
98. Lawrence, supra note 96, at 452.
99. Shifflin, supra note 97, at 86.
100. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
101. Id. at 512.
102. Kristin E. Voelkl, School Warmth, Class Participation, and Achievement, 63
J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 127, 129-130, 135-138 (1995) (synthesizing a long list of
studies showing a strong correlation between class participation and academic
achievement and concluding, based on the author's own study, that class participation
has a significant impact on academic success).
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impairment of the capacity for interpersonal relationships; and, fi-
nally, it frequently creates the conditions for violence.1 03
In a society where sexuality, sexual orientation, and noncomformity to sexual
norms is a weapon that perpetuates inequality, the antigay aggressor uses his
speech to push gays further down the social ladder.
Inspiring self-hatred and encouraging others to join in the identity-based
harassment are also anathematic to a productive educational environment.
The negative effects that student anxiety, depression, self-hatred, and fear -
all results of identity-based aggression - have on academic success are well
documented. 10 And, encouraging high rates of truancy, drop outs, and fail-
103. Shiffrin, supra note 97, at 86; see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:
A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133, 144-46, 179 (1982); Lawrence, supra note 96, at 453, 468. See generally
Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (examining the
causes of the perception held by main minorities that the court system in biases);
Matsuda, supra note 97 (arguing for criminal sanctions for hate speech because of its
harmful effects).
104. E.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir.
2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007) ("Speech that attacks high school students who
are members of minority groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected to
verbal and physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate
them, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity
to learn. The demeaning of young gay and lesbian students in a school environment
is detrimental not only to their psychological health and well-being, but also to their
educational development. Indeed, studies demonstrate that 'academic underachieve-
ment, truancy, and dropout are prevalent among homosexual youth and are the prob-
able consequences of violence and verbal and physical abuse at school.' One study
has found that among teenage victims of anti-gay discrimination, [seventy-five per-
cent] experienced a decline in academic performance, [thirty-nine percent] had tru-
ancy problems and [twenty-eight percent] dropped out of school. Another study con-
firmed that gay students had difficulty concentrating in school and feared for their
safety as a result of peer harassment, and that verbal abuse led some gay students to
skip school and others to drop out altogether. Indeed, gay teens suffer a school drop-
out rate over three times the national average. In short, it is well established that
attacks on students on the basis of their sexual orientation are harmful not only to the
students' health and welfare, but also to their educational performance and their ulti-
mate potential for success in life.") (internal citations omitted); see MICHAEL
BOCHENEK & A. WIDNEY BROWN, HUMAN RTS. WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS:
VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S. SCHOOLS 49 (2001); Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The
Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth in our Public
Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 67, 76-77 (1994) (describing how abuse by
peers causes gay youth to experience social isolation and drop out of school); Maurice
R. Dyson & Nicolyn Harris, Safe Rules or Gays' Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual
Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 187 (2004)
(gay teens "face greater risks of . . . dropping out [and] performing poorly in
school"); Amy Lovell, "Other Students Always Used to Say, 'Look at the Dykes':
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ure cannot be part of any measure of a school's mission. On a wider scale,
schools that fail to respond to identity-based aggressionios or, worse still, fail
to recognize racist, sexist, or antigay aggression as identity-based, o0 teach
and legitimize racism, sexism, and homophobia, while giving majority stu-
dents a false sense of entitlement and power.
The third special effect of identity-based aggression is it "degrade[s]
public discourse by skewing society's assessment" of members of victimized
groups.107 As Professors Citron and Norton explain in the hate speech con-
text, racist speech tends to crowd out positive discourse and, by reaffirming
or inspiring prejudice, results in discriminatory decisions on employment,
housing, and other rights.108 It causes stigmatization, strengthens the hold
that stereotypes have on minorities, and, as discussed supra, keeps those
groups at the margins of society.10 9 These evils - prejudice, stereotyping, and
inequality - are not the values public schools should teach, yet failure to dis-
cipline or address identity-based aggression turns schools into tacit abettors.
Using the Internet or other digital technologies as tools of identity-based
aggression - a subset of what I have called cyberaggression110 - makes these
effects exponentially worse in four related ways. First, Professors Citron and
Norton remind us that the pseudonymity offered by the Internet "can ... ac-
celerate destructive behavior" because people tend to behave more aggres-
sively when they feel they cannot be observed or caught - a phenomenon that
Protecting Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
617, 625-28 (1998) (summarizing the negative effects on gay students of peer sexual
orientation harassment); Susanne M. Stronski Huwiler & Gary Remafedi, Adolescent
Homosexuality, 33 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 151, 164 (1999); Waldman, Hostile Educational
Environments, supra note 8, at 758-59; Waldman, Tormented, supra note 10, at 399-
402; Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment as
Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 189,
225 (2005); Bullying and Gay Youth, MENTAL HEALTH AM.
http://www.nmha.org/index.cfm?objectid=CA866DCF-I 372-4D20-
C8EB26EEB30B9982 (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
105. E.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 450-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
106. See Steve Karnowski, Anoka-Hennepin Gender-Neutral School Policy: Min-
nesota School Board Ends Policy Blamed for Bullying, HUFFINGTON POsT (Feb. 14,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/minn-school-board-ends-po n
1275843.html; see also Steve Karnowski, Anoka-Hennepin School District Settles
Lawsuits over Gay Bullying, Gender Neutral Policy, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 6,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/06/minn-school-district-sett-n
1323791.html.
107. Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1451.
108. Id. (citing Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 1813).
109. Id (citing R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.REv. 803, 844-48 (2004)); see also supra notes 51-
54 and accompanying text.
110. Waldman, Hostile Educational Environments, supra note 8, at 736-38.
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applies to aggressor behavior toward strangers and acquaintances alike.II
Therefore, aggressors may be willing to say things online that social norms
prevent them from saying face-to-face. Second, simple, easy, and free digital
communication eliminates the economic and opportunity costs associated
with aggressive behavior.l12 Creating a Facebook page that gathers hundreds
of supporters for "I HATE GAYS" or "Keep Queers Out of America"l 3 is
much easier than gathering a posse willing to terrorize an African-American
neighborhood or a lesbian couple's residence.114 Third, online aggression is
permanent.115 A single racial or homophobic slur at school can be devastat-
ing, but it is fleeting; however, a single "I Hate" video or one derogatory
comment on a photograph remains online forever, not only because it could
be viewed many times, but also because search engine algorithms can find
digital information that might have been cached years ago.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for gay teens struggling with iden-
tity-based aggression, cyberaggression turns what is supposed to be a safe
haven into a danger zone. Because ga teenagers are more vulnerable and
isolated than their heterosexual peers,' they rely more on online social net-
111. Citron & Norton, supra note 88, at 1447. Professor Citron collected sources
documenting this phenomenon in her article, Cyber Civil Rights. Citron, Cyber Civil
Rights, supra note 13; see ARNOLD P. GOLDSTEIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP
AGGRESSION 30, 32 (Clive R. Hollin & Mary McMurran eds., 2002); RALPH H.
TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 165, 408 (32d ed. 1987);
PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING How GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 25 (2007); Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Rea-
son, and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 237, 266-70 (William J. Arnold & David Levin eds.,
1969); see also Evan R. Harrington, The Social Psychology of Hatred, 3 J. HATE
STUDIES 49, 60-61 (2004), http://web02.gonzaga.edulagainsthate/joumal3
/GHSI l0.pdf (discussing the fact that participants dressed in Ku Klux Klan-type
outfits gave greater shocks than participants dressed in nurse outfits); Tizra Leader et
al., Without Mercy: The Immediate Impact of Group Size on Lynch Mob Atrocity, 33
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 1340, 1342 (2007),
http://www.sagepub.com/evansmprstudy/articles/Chapter04_ArticleO2.pdf.
112. Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1447.
113. See Badash, Facebook or Hate Book?, supra note 7.
114. See Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at
1447 (citing Kyu Ho Youm, First Amendment Law: Hate Speech, Equality, and Free-
dom of Expression, 51 J. COMM. 406 (2001) (reviewing TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS
HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL (1998); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE AND THE
MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999); JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY,
AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE (1999) (recounting how white
supremacist Don Black admitted that the Internet allowed him to disseminate his
views much easier than before))).
115. Citron & Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech, supra note 88, at 1452.
116. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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works to replace non-existent face-to-face communities. Facebook,
MySpace, and other websites are essential tools for interaction among mem-
bers of certain population enclaves that are forced underground due to social
stigma, religious intolerance, or legal problems. Douglas Heckathorn calls
these groups "hidden populations," 1l9 and gay, lesbian, and questioning ado-
lescents are perfect examples of members of these groups.120 Adolescents
growing up in regions without a significant gay presence or students who
choose, for various reasons, to remain closeted, are presumably less likely to
self-identify as gay, lesbian, or questioning in their physical, face-to-face
communities. Social networking technologies that allow roughly anonymous
virtual interaction with like-minded individuals through chat rooms, dating
sites, and blogs often are these adolescents' only source of camaraderie with
the only people to whom they can relate. Therefore, these adolescents are not
only frequent Internet users,121 but are also completely reliant upon their In-
ternet use and the virtual community they create for social support, informa-
tion about their sexuality, and answers to any questions they have about being
gay.122 Empirical data supports this proposition. As early as 2001, more than
eighty-five percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual adolescents "reported that
the Internet had been an important resource for them to connect with LGB
peers."l23 Destruction of, or impingement upon, that online social support
network through cyberbullying is, therefore, particularly harmful.
117. See Vincent M.B. Silenzio et al., Connecting the Invisible Dots: Reaching
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adolescents and Young Adults at Risk for Suicide
Through Online Social Networks, 69 Soc. ScI. & MED. 469, 469 (2009); GLSEN
2009, supra note 1.
118. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling H: Deriving Valid
Population Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations, 49 Soc.
PROBS. 11, 11 (2002) (stating that sampling of certain groups is "complicated by
privacy concerns based on the stigma associated with membership in the population"
and must therefore reach into other alternatives to gather data). One type of hidden
population member is one that cannot come forward and identify himself for fear of
legal reprisal, like an intravenous drug user. Id. As such, it is difficult for social
scientists to reach this population for study. Id. Professor Heckathorn has pioneered
the use of online social networks to reach this type of population.
119. Id.
120. See id. (referencing injection drug users, homosexual men, and the homeless
as examples of hidden populations).
121. Silenzio et al., supra note 117, 469 (2009).
122. See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech,
and Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 159, 162 (2003) (describing how the
Internet has provided isolated gay men and lesbians in otherwise hostile environments
"a virtual community that constitutes an emotional lifeline").
123. Silenzio, supra note 117, at 469 (citing LYNNE HILLIER ET AL., AUSTL.
RESEARCH CTR. IN SEX, HEALTH AND Soc'Y, 'IT'S JUST EASIER': THE INTERNET AS A
SAFETY-NET FOR SAME SEX ATTRACTED YOUNG PEOPLE (2001)).
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IV. IDENTITY-BASED AGGRESSION AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
The severe effects of identity-based aggression on victims, those who
identify with them, and the school as a whole are well documented, severe,
and undisputed.124 But that only gets us so far. We have not yet assessed the
sufficiency of these effects as a matter of law; nor, for that matter, have we
proven their relevance for determining whether school discipline is consistent
with the First Amendment. These are the goals of the remainder of this Arti-
cle, and I argue that because a close reading of the Supreme Court's student
speech cases reveals that a school-focused effects test is the consistent ration-
ale underlying student speech restrictions, the effects of identity-based ag-
gression are both relevant and sufficient to legitimize school discipline of its
perpetrators. That is, the Supreme Court has focused its attention on the
harms certain types of student speech can have on the school: its ability to
teach, its reputation, and its adherence to educational values. And, because
identity-based aggression has the unique ability to destroy educational oppor-
tunities, to make it impossible for schools to teach their students, and to put
schools in the position of enforcing bigotry and hate, schools can restrict such
speech consistent with First Amendment values.
Since 2000, most courts addressing identity-based aggression cases,
which often involved Confederate flag displays or antigay attacks, have relied
on the first part of the Tinker test: student speech may be restricted if it "ma-
terially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school."l 25 The results suggest how little
courts understand about identity-based aggression and the Tinker standard.
For example, some jurisdictions would only approve restrictions on Confed-
erate flag displays if schools demonstrated a link to racial unrest or showed
"ample reason" that the display would create racial disturbances for the
school.126 In a case involving a white student wearing a t-shirt that read,
"Homosexuality is a sin!. Islam is a lie! Abortion is murder! Some issues are
just black and white!", the court found no justification for disciplining the
124. See supra Part III.B.
125. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). The few courts that have
applied Fraser to Confederate flag display cases have generally upheld the restric-
tions, finding that allowing the flag display would interfere with the school's mission
to teach tolerance and respect for others. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty.,
324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia
Cnty., 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
126. D.B. ex rel. Brogdon v. Lafon, No. 06-5982, 217 F. App'x 518, 525 (6th Cir.
2007) (per curiam); see also West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d
1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000) (permitting a restriction on a Confederate flag display
because of evidence of verbal confrontations between white and black students in the
past).
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student because the student was merely expressing "a potentially offensive
political viewpoint" like a "George W. Bush International Terrorist" t-shirt,127
and because the school offered no "evidence of any history of violence or
disorder in the school or any other circumstances that would justify a reason-
able likelihood of disruption."1 28 These are formalist approaches to Tinker
and identity-based aggression cases; they require specific evidence to apply to
a strict rule on restricting speech. They also ignore any distinction, as dis-
cussed above, between an attack on an opinion (albeit a passionate one) and
an attack on core, identifying characteristics essential to personhood. These
courts place details over meaning, misunderstanding the Supreme Court's
distaste for hard and fast rules when determining the legitimacy of school
discipline of student speech.
The Ninth Circuit eschewed the "substantial disruption" quagmire by
analyzing one identity-based aggression case under Tinker's second prong:
student speech can be restricted if it "inva[des] the rights of others."129 In
Harper, the court upheld a school's ban on a student t-shirt that degraded
gays ("Homosexuality is Shameful, Be Ashamed, Our School Embraced
What God Has Condemned," on the front, and "Homosexuality is Shameful,"
on the back) because this speech - an example of identity-based aggression
against gays - collided with the rights of others.'30 This mode of analysis
seemed to avoid the question of effects;i13 the question was about rights, not
sociological impact: "[p]ublic school students who may be injured by verbal
assaults on the basis of a core, identifying characteristic such as race, religion,
or sexual orientation, have a right to be free from such attacks."1 32 After all,
the court noted, Tinker recognized the right to "be secure and to be let
alone,"' 33 which must mean freedom from "psychological attacks that cause
young people to question their self-worth and their rightful place in soci-
ety."134 And, because identity-based aggression interferes with this right to
be let alone, "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men," 135 such hateful speech could be restricted in accordance with
First Amendment principles.
At a minimum, the "rights of others" approach appreciates the gravity of
identity-based aggression and arguably considers it a categorical Constitu-
127. Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967, 971
(S.D. Ohio 2005).
128. Id. at 973.
129. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
130. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1178 (9th Cir.
2006), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
131. See supra Part III.B.
132. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178.
133. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
134. Id.
135. Id (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000)).
136. Id.
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tional evil because it is inconsistent with other individual rights. It recognizes
that the essence of identity-based aggression is its function as a tool against
minorities: the court applied its ruling to protect minority students who "have
historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical abuse, and made
to feel inferior."l 37 The "rights of others" approach also understands that
identity-based aggression will always "damage [those students'] sense of
security and interfere with their opportunity to learn." 38  But, although
Harper is consistent with the sociology and psychology of identity-based
harm, it may not stand on solid legal ground for one important reason: if we
go beyond the formal misapplication of Tinker that has characterized so many
student speech cases, we see that the harms identified in Harper are precisely
the harms the Supreme Court has said counsel in favor of speech restrictions.
In other words, the Harper approach is simply unnecessary.
To understand how this is so, we must determine what it is about certain
student speech that tilts the balance in favor of lawful restrictions. This in-
quiry requires us to go beyond the "substantial disruption" standard and reach
for the consistent rationale behind all student speech restrictions. Too many
courts and commentators accept the not-incorrect, yet superficial explanation
that Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse are exceptions to Tinker and thus, incapa-
ble of elaborating the contours of the Court's rationale. They prefer the legal
formalism of one test and three exceptions to the practical reality that the
Court's student speech jurisprudence has created a balancing test that tries to
respect both modern liberal and classical Aristotelian values in public educa-
tion. They miss the consistent rationale linking Tinker and its progeny:
what matters are effects of the behavior on the school.
The student speech in Tinker was notable for the absence of any effect it
had on the school, but the majority still tipped its hat - albeit in an exceed-
ingly general way - as to the kinds of effects that mattered. In Tinker, a
number of students wore black armbands to protest American involvement in
the Vietnam War in violation of a recently adopted school policy prohibiting
armband protests.' 40 Because the protest was "passive" and refrained from
"aggressive, disruptive action," the Court found that silencing this student
expression of "direct, primary First Amendment rights" was unlawful. 141
But, while the operative fact of Tinker is the absence of disruption, it is clear
what manner of disruption concerned the Court: "interference, actual or nas-
cent, with the schools' work." 42 The armband protest merited Constitutional
protection because neither the "work of the schools [n]or any class was dis-
137. Id.
13 8. Id.
139. See infra Part V.
140. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
141. Id. at 508.
142. Id.
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rupted;"l 43 the protest did not "interrupt[] school activities" or "intrude" into
the school's daily affairs.'" In other words, there needed to be a reasonable
forecast of effects that would make it impossible for the school to fulfill its
educational function; classroom disorder, interruptions in class, and interfer-
ence with the school's ability to keep students in class and paying attention
are only the most obvious forms of unacceptable disruptions.
Tinker lacks further specifics. But, in holding that a school can restrict a
student's lewd speech at a school event, Bethel School District v. Fraser,
helps clarify the Court's underlying balancing test in student speech cases.
Fraser involved a student who nominated a fellow student for class president
by giving a speech with "an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual meta-
phor," 45 something that Chief Justice Burger found was inconsistent with the
school's educational mission to teach fundamental values necessary for de-
mocracy.146 If the purpose of American public education was to "prepare
pupils for citizenship" or teach the "habits and manners of civility," 47 permit-
ting a student to deliver a graphically lewd speech winking toward a male
student's sexual prowess was inconsistent with that mission for a number of
reasons: vulgar language has no place in civilized debate, the school would
become a model for inappropriate behavior,148 and the speech itself would
damage other young students whom the school must teach and protect.149
Most scholars take the conventional view that Fraser carved out an exception
to Tinker because, when lewd speech is involved, Fraser says that a school
need not show evidence of a substantial disruption.' 50 And yet, if we consider
what actually concerned the Court in Fraser, it was still the effects Fraser's
speech had on the school, regardless of it reaching some disruptive threshold.
That is, it was the effects of the speech and their inconsistency with a
school's basic educational mission that brought Chief Justice Burger to this
decision. A school could not teach civility, virtue, and tolerance for others'
views if it became a model for the opposite values of vulgarity, callousness
toward the feelings of others, and lack of order.15'
143. Id.
144. Id. at 514.
145. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986).
146. Id. at 683.
147. Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
148. Id. at 683.
149. Id. at 683-84.
150. Id. at 685.
151. The majority noted that, by "glorifying male sexuality ... the speech was
acutely insulting to teenage girl students," and caused young students "on the thresh-
old of awareness of human sexuality" to be "bewildered" and mimic Mr. Fraser's
words and body language. Id at 683-84. In context, it does not seem that Chief Jus-
tice Burger was concerned about the sexist nature of Mr. Fraser's speech, but the
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In holding that schools could determine that vulgar and lewd speech
would undermine the schools' basic educational mission, Fraser not only
indicates that the Court is concerned with effects on the school when balanc-
ing the unique school environment with free speech principles, but also
broadens the types of effects that merit restriction. Tinker addressed protests,
and the attendant disruption possible from students getting up in the middle of
class, agitating the school population, and inciting a riot.152 Fraser saw more
subtle, but no less damaging effects on a school that is put in the position of
tacitly approving inappropriate language by allowing Mr. Fraser to go on
without punishment. Teaching respectful debate and civic engagement that
does not interfere with the school's work has a positive effect on the school,
its ability to teach, and its reputation: the school becomes a place of active
learning, civility, and debate. Sociologists studying education have proven
that.153 But, allowing students to use vulgar and lewd language at a school-
sponsored event would make it impossible to teach the impropriety of curse
words and sexist language in civil society.
The subsequent decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier re-
affirmed the Court's focus on student speech that handicaps a school's ability
to teach its established curriculum. In Kuhlmeier, a principal censored two
articles in a school newspaper produced as part of a journalism class; one
article discussed teen pregnancy, the other addressed an anonymous student's
experience with divorce. 54 The principal was concerned that the students
could be identified in context, which could lead to embarrassment and ostra-
cism. The Court also was aware that students created this official school
paper as part of their journalism class curriculum. 156 The Court concluded
that schools cannot be forced into a position of countenancing inappropriate
speech that bears the imprimatur of the school, whether inappropriate via bad
grammar, vulgarity, or inappropriate for student readers.157  Otherwise,
schools "would be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role" of teaching
cultural values, preparing students for professional training, and helping chil-
dren adapt to the civilized world. To the Court, this kind of student speech
could have just as much effect on the school's ability to teach as disciplinary
breakdowns associated with group protests, and lewd and vulgar speeches at
school assemblies. All three forms of speech distract from the curriculum
effect of tolerating this kind of speech on the school's ability to teach proper civic
values. Id. at 684.
152. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-08 (1969).
153. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohen, Social, Emotional, Ethical, and Academic Educa-
tion: Creating a Climate for Learning, Participation in Democracy, and Well-Being,
76 HARV. EDUC. REV. 202, 205-08, 212-13 (2006).
154. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
155. Id.
156. See id
157. Id. at 271.
158. Id. at 272.
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and affect the school's reputation, its practical and moral authority, and stu-
dent academic success.
The same analysis held sway in Morse v. Frederick, where the Court
permitted a school to discipline a student for speech that could reasonably be
construed as promoting illegal drug use. 5  Mr. Frederick unfurled a banner
that read, "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," during a school-approved social event.i1o
Though the district superintendant justified the principal's decision to disci-
pline the student on the rounds that the banner was "disruptive to the event,"
he never specified how. VI Nor did that matter to the Court. The admittedly
"silly" banner could be interpreted to encourage illegal drug use, which is
anathematic to school and public policy in general. 162 The Court went to
great lengths to emphasize the devastating effects of drug use on young chil-
dren; on the growing drug problem among American youth; and the time,
money, and energy Congress, the states, and local schools boards have spent
on drug-prevention programs.163 This reminder served not only to establish
the evils of drugs, but also to highlight the incongruity between drug-related
speech and a school. 16 After all, students who "celebrat[e] illegal drug use at
a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, ...
pose[] a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those
entrusted to their care"165 because, like the school in Fraser, any overt or tacit
approval of the speech would put the school in the position of teaching les-
sons contrary to the curriculum, thus handicapping the school's ability to
teach.
Therefore, in terms of the kinds of effects that permit school discipline
of student speech consistent with the First Amendment, there is little that
distinguishes lewd speech (Fraser), speech that could bear the imprimatur of
the school (Kuhlmeier), and drug-related speech (Morse) from Tinker's arm-
band protest. All four types of speech could interfere with the school's ability
to teach successfully: protests could interrupt class, distract students, and lead
to a breakdown in discipline; lewd speech at an assembly similarly breaks
down discipline and puts the school in a position of tacitly approving inap-
propriate language and sexist behavior; student speech associated with class
curricula necessarily forces the school to sponsor that speech, which, if inap-
propriate, would interfere with how classes are taught; and permitting drug-
related speech at a school sponsored event ignores stated local, state, and
federal policy that schools should teach students not to take illegal drugs. To
159. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
160. Id. at 397.
161. Id. at 399.
162. Id. at 409-10.
163. Id. at 407-08.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 408.
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be sure, there are differences among these cases,166 but the underlying ration-
ale for restricting speech seems to be uniformly clear: student speech can be
restricted consistent with the First Amendment when permitting it would
force the school to tolerate or endorse speech that does violence to the
school's ability to teach its students successfully.
The connection between a given example of student speech and damage
to a school's ability to teach successfully is not always direct. Tinker-like
protest speech has a first-degree connection to the operative harm: a protest is
a disruption to the school's ability to teach its students because it may involve
students staging walk-outs in the middle of class, sit-ins in the middle of
hallways, or cacophonous marches, for example. The silent armband protest
in Tinker merited Constitutional protection specifically because none of these
effects could be reasonably expected. Lewd speech, non-curricular speech,
and drug-related speech, however, affect the school more subtly via a second-
degree connection; they may cause disciplinary breakdowns, but more impor-
tantly, they put the school in a position of tacit approval of behavior that is
incongruous with American public education, thus damaging the school's
authority to teach the values and lessons it is charged to teach by the state.
This is precisely the effect that tolerating identity-based aggression has
on a school. As discussed above, identity-based aggression carries with it all
the negative effects of face-to-face aggression - depression, anxiety, with-
167drawal, difficulty in social situations, suicidal ideation - and piles on addi-
tional harms that irreparably harm a school's ability to teach - increased tru-
ancy rates, silencing victims and those who identify with them, instilling fear,
legitimization of discrimination, and skewing societal views of victimized
168
groups.
These effects are especially pronounced when LGBT youth are the vic-
tims. As a result of identity-based aggression, more than 61 percent of LGBT
students reported that they felt unsafe at school because of their sexual orien-
tation, and 39.9 percent felt unsafe at school because of how they expressed
their gender.169 In three studies between 2000 and 2004, Professor Ian Rivers
found that bullying of LGBT students starts earlier than with others, at around
ten or eleven years old, and usually continued for at least four to six years.170
More than seventy percent of respondents reported feigning illness or skip-
ping school to avoid face-to-face abuse, and those respondents were five
166. For one thing, the anti-war protest in Tinker is much closer to classic dissent-
ing political speech, which deserves the widest protection in our category-based First
Amendment jurisprudence. That explains why the threshold for restricting Tinker-
like speech, i.e., the "substantial disruption" standard, is higher than the effects
threshold in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.
167. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
168. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
169. GLSEN 2009, supra note 1, at xvi, 22.
170. Ian Rivers, Recollections of Bullying at School and Their Long-Term Impli-
cations for Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, 25 CRISIS 169, 171 (2004).
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times more likely to report having experienced suicidal ideation and to have
made suicide attempts than those who reported no absenteeism. 7' Another
study found that boys who reported being bullied because they were gay ex-
perienced negative emotional effects significantly more severe than those
who were bullied for other reasons.172 Gay male victims and boys who are
bullied because of perceived homosexuality have more negative views of
school, experience higher levels of anxiety and depression into adulthood,
perform significantly worse in school, generally restrict their expressions of
emotion, and fail to develop interpersonal skills and connections.'73 Various
scholars suggest that the greater harm to gay boys - real or perceived - is
based on a social "gender straitjacket" that locks boys into the view that any
expression of vulnerability is tantamount to femininity, which, in turn, is re-
cast as evidence of being gay.174 Consequently, a vicious cycle ensues - gay
boys then bully other boys, in part, to burnish their masculine bona fides,
leaving heterosexual boys susceptible to antigay bullying and leaving real gay
boys to "feel less than whole" not because of their sexual identity but because
of a "damaging code" that reinforces their exclusion from the majority of
their peers.175 A school cannot teach reading, writing, or arithmetic, let alone
essential skills for civic and professional engagement, if its minority students
are feigning illness to avoid school, or feel unsafe every time they raise their
hands or walk the halls. A school that tolerates this state of affairs reminds
victimized students and those that identify with them that they are unworthy,
further damaging their self-esteem and willingness to learn. And, as depres-
sion, truancy, and fear rise, test scores, love of learning, and social develop-
ment fall. These are symptoms of a sick school, and they make it impossible
for a school to teach its designated curriculum.
What is more, these connections are not speculative; our law has already
recognized them. As far back as Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme
Court perceived the connection between discrimination against minority
youth, their ability to learn, and a school that fosters educational failure. 176In
a similar vein, the Ninth Circuit in Harper proved the devastating impact
identity-based aggression has on a school's ability to teach. The Court cited
countless studies showing the connection between antigay harassment, educa-
tional failure, and other sick school symptoms.177 And, in Nuxoll, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that antigay speech that "will lead to a decline in stu-
171. Ian Rivers, Social Exclusion, Absenteeism, and Sexual Minority Youth, 15
SUPPORT FOR LEARNING 13, 15-16 (2000).
172. Swearer et al., supra note 86, at 170.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id.
176. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
177. Harper v. Poway Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated,
549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
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dents' test scores, an upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school,"
would rise to the level of a "substantial disruption" under Tinker.178 Al-
though this Article eschews the formalism of that test in favor of a broader
understanding of the rationale underlying all of the Supreme Court's student
speech cases, Nuxoll nevertheless understood the connections between iden-
tity-based aggression and a school's inability to teach. The court not only
distinguished between opinions or preferences (choosing Pepsi over Coke)
and deeply held, core characteristics like sexual orientation, 179 but also fore-
saw "a deterioration in the school's ability to educate its students" if antigay
aggression turns into a negative comment ping-pong match about homosexu-
ality and religion.180 It further noted that "students subjected to derogatory
comments" about core, identifying characteristics "may find it even harder
than usual to concentrate on their studies and perform up to the school's ex-
pectations." 8 1  A school that permits identity-based aggression actively
harms its students by damaging its ability to teach them and lowering the
school's academic performance. The First Amendment should not counte-
nance such results in the school context.
V. CONSISTENCY WITH LIBERAL AND CLASSICAL EDUCATIONAL
VALUES
We have seen that many federal courts fail to recognize that identity-
based aggression effectuates a group harm capable of damaging a school's
ability to teach its students successfully and that this is precisely the type of
harm the Court was concerned with in Tinker, Fraser, Kuhimeier, and Morse.
That failure may reflect a combination of unclear Supreme Court guidance;
conservative hostility to our burgeoning understanding of racist, sexist, and
homophobic speech; and, most importantly, the moral bankruptcy of much of
our modem First Amendment jurisprudence.182 And yet, understanding the
connection between identity-based aggression, severe group harm, and school
deterioration would respect both the classical Aristotelian and modem liberal
values that have come to coexist awkwardly, yet sustainably in our student
speech jurisprudence. Aristotle would counsel that speech restrictions on
students should be distilled through the lens of the purpose of education -
namely, to teach civility and character and to prepare students for future par-
ticipation and leadership in the community. Modem liberals would resist
178. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674
(7th Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 675-76.
180. Id. at 672.
181. Id. at 671.
182. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 194 (2011).
183. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
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such virtue education as incompatible with a pluralistic society and instead
argue from a rights-based, rather than a purpose-based perspective: broad
student speech freedom fosters educational development through exposure to
different ideas.184 These ideas can be in conflict, but they coexist in the
Court's student speech jurisprudence.
A. Classic Aristotelian Values
Aristotle's philosophy is teleological, which is to say that he thinks
about the right thing to do or how to structure a political community by rea-
soning from the purpose, or telos, of the thing. And he thinks about educa-
tion in the same way. 8 For example, Americans think politics should be
structured as a fair system to execute the needs of the voting public, and our
representative republic is based on a rough form of representative equality. 187
Aristotle started from a different perspective, by asking one question: what is
the purpose of politics?188 To him, politics was not about setting up a frame-
work that values individual rights and does not interfere with citizens' rights
to choose their own ends, but rather politics was supposed to create "good
citizens and to cultivate character." 89 "[A]ny polis," he wrote, "must devote
itself to the end of encouraging goodness . . . . Otherwise, . . . law becomes a
mere covenant . . . 'a guarantor of men's rights against one another' - instead
of being, as it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a
polis good and just."1 90 A polis is an association whose goal is nothing less
than "the good life, and the institutions of social life are means to that end."19'
Under that vision, participation in the polis, through leadership, debate, and
service is man's highest calling.192 Only the best, most virtuous people
should hold office, not only because they will enact the best policies that
achieve the purposes of the city, but because politics exists to honor their
civic virtue.1 93
184. See infra Part V.B.
185. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING To Do? 186 (2009).
186. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
187. Modem liberal societies focus on the primacy of justice in politics through
the so-called one-person, one-vote principle. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 558 (1964). According to Chief Justice Warren, "[1]egislators represent people,
not trees or acres," and any legislative apportionment scheme other than one-person,
one-vote would not "achiev[e] ... fair and effective representation for all citizens."
Id. at 562, 565-66.
188. See SANDEL, supra note 185, at 192-93.
189. Id. at 193.
190. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book 111, ch. ix (1280b).
191. Id.
192. SANDEL, supra note 185, at 193-94.
193. For a summary of this argument, see id. at 184-207.
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This is how Aristotle thought about education, as well. Schools are es-
sential to train youth for future civic participation in the polis, which requires
virtue and a respect for government; after all, the "best laws ... will be of no
avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the
constitution." The goal of any school should be "to make [men] good and
disposed to do what is noble."195 Therefore, though some may disagree on
the means of teaching the young, the goal must be the education of "virtue"
for its eventual channeling into man's highest and core calling: the polis.19 6
Early American education took on this decidedly Aristotelian bent: edu-
cation built civic virtue and stressed the importance of community, both of
which were essential for the success of the American experiment. In his es-
say, "On Education of Youth in America," Noah Webster stated that educa-
tion should "not only diffuse a knowledge of the sciences but ... implant in
the minds of the American youth the principles of virtue and of liberty and
inspire them with just and liberal ideas of government and with an inviolable
attachment to their own country."' 97 Benjamin Rush reminded us that "with-
out virtue there can be no liberty,"l 98 and both Samuel and John Adams, who
agreed about very little, believed that freedom could not exist without civic
virtue.199 Anonymous opponents of the Constitution felt that "free govern-
ment" required the "body of the people [be] ... virtuous"2oo because "virtuous
people make just laws, and good laws tend to preserve unchanged a virtuous
people."201 To these early American leaders, democracy depended not merely
on constitutions or the protection of individual rights, but rather on the moral
and civic character of the American people. Therefore, any public education
system had to foster and encourage that civic virtue.
The Supreme Court's student speech jurisprudence has shown an on-
again-off-again respect for this Aristotelian tradition. In Fraser, for example,
the majority based its decision to sanction the disciplinary consequences of
Fraser's lewd speech on the "fundamental values" of American public educa-
194. Id. at Book V, ch. vii (1310a).
195. CHRISTOPHER J. LUCAS, OUR WESTERN EDUCATIONAL HERITAGE 88 (1971).
196. ARISTOTLE, supra note 190, at Book VIII, ch. i (1337a).
197. Noah Webster, On The Education of Youth in America, in ESSAYS ON
EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 41, 45 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965).
198. Benjamin Rush, Thoughts Upon The Mode of Education Proper in a Repub-
lic, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, supra note 197, at 9-10.
199. Letter from Samuel Adams to John Scollay (Dec. 30, 1780), in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 236, 238 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1908); Letter
from John Adams to Mercy Warren (April 16, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
200. Letters of Centinel I. (Oct. 5, 1787), in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
130, 139 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
201. Letters from the Federal Farmer VII, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 200, at 214, 266.
2012] 685
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
202tion. Schools had to "prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic" and
"inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves condu-
cive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-government." 203
They taught "the shared values of a civilized social order," not just reading,
writing, and arithmetic.204 As such, the First Amendment could not interfere
with a school's determination that Fraser's speech was incompatible with
those goals;205 otherwise, public education would not be fulfilling its essential
democratic purpose. Similarly, in Kuhlmeier, the Court concluded that the
First Amendment could not interfere with a school's mission to teach impor-
tant civic responsibilities, like leadership and a responsible press in a democ-
racy.206 And, although Justice Alito's concurrence in Morse attempts to dis-
claim a school's "educational mission" as a valid basis for restricting
speech,207 it is hard to argue that civic-mindedness and the preparation of
students for future participation in a civilized society is absent from the
Court's conception of public schools and student speech.208
Disciplining identity-based aggressors is consistent with this Aristote-
lian, or "perfectionist" vision of education. A school's policy against deni-
grating and harassing students based on core, identifying characteristics of
those students would teach civility and mature coexistence in a pluralistic
society, an important value necessary for respectful debate and cooperation in
a democracy. A modem pluralistic society could not succeed if its citizenry
was accustomed to the legitimacy of hate and discrimination, precisely the
values learned from identity-based aggression.209 Just like the First Amend-
ment could not prevent schools from concluding that lewd speech or drug-
related speech was inconsistent with their goals, free speech principles should
not interfere with a school that recognizes the significant social and educa-
tional harms wrought by identity-based aggression.
B. Modern Liberal Values
Free speech principles could only interfere with a school recognizing the
harms caused by identity-based aggression if we believed in an absolutist
liberal or autonomy-based conception of the First Amendment. Therefore,
some commentators argue that the classical educational tradition is in con-
stant conflict with more modem liberal perspectives on education based on
202. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
203. Id. (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
204. Id. at 683.
205. Id. at 685-86.
206. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
207. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
208. See, e.g., id. at 403.
209. See supra Part Ill.B and accompanying text.
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student rights, freedom, autonomy, and the social good of being exposed to
new and different views. While many have argued that Aristotelian and lib-
eral values underlie very different free speech principles, 210 disciplining iden-
tity-based aggressors is consistent with both sets of values.
In the free speech context, liberal principles of autonomy and respect for
individuals211 refer to the respect we give to the individual's right of self-
expression without a government proscribing any particular viewpoint or
topics for debate.212 Much of the Court's free speech rhetoric from the 1970s
213to today emphasizes autonomy, respecting the Kantian and Rawlsian view
that the locus of speech rights was the self qua self, not as a tool of some
greater social good. In Cohen v. California,214 for example, the Court re-
versed a conviction of a Los Angeles man who wore a jacket with the words
"Fuck the Draft" emblazoned on the back.215 What animated that decision
was the speaker's autonomy: the right of free expression, the Court stated, "is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us" because our "political system" rests on
"the premise of individual dignity and choice."216 Rather than, say, Justice
Brandeis's2 17 and Alexander Hamilton's2 18 belief that free expression served
210. The literature on the "[t]he fundamental conflict in public schools between
[the] inculcation of values and a student marketplace of ideas," is extensive. See
William Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum, and the First Amendment, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 505, 506 n.4 (1989); Mark Yudoff, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and
Student Expression, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 365, 366 (1995) (stating that public
schools are increasingly "devoted to the socialization of the young and to the inculca-
tion of values and skills"); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Aristotle's Internet: Free
Speech Values Online, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty (forthcoming 2013).
211. The political and philosophical story underlying the liberal values of auton-
omy and individual rights is too voluminous to tell here. The tradition, indebted to the
enlightenment thinker Immanuel Kant, and neo-Kantians like Rawls and Dworkin,
may span varying conceptions of liberalism, but all are based on respect for individu-
als as ends in themselves. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (Allen W. Wood, ed. 2002); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
212. See SANDEL, supra note 185, at 107.
213. E.g., Ariz. Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806, 2826 (2011) ("The First Amendment emodies our choice as a Nation that,
when it comes to such speech, the guiding principle is freedom - the 'unfettered inter-
change of ideas."').
214. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
215. Id. at 16, 26.
216. Id. at 24.
217. For Brandeis, the purpose of the First Amendment was to ensure that the
citizenry could fulfill its responsibility to engage in active public discussion about
political matters. Justice Brandeis made this point in his concurrence in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
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some communal end, the Court in Cohen emphasized a distinctly personal
freedom with no attendant good other than the benefit of individual freedom
itself.219
This respect for autonomy manifests itself in the pure "marketplace of
ideas" as a primary First Amendment goal.220 That is, the First Amendment
requires government to act as a neutral arbitrator in the marketplace of ideas,
(1969), where a unanimous Court upheld the conviction of a man who tried to estab-
lish a communist party, stating that "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert peo-
ple; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government." Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Nota-
bly, Justice Brandeis may have been more influenced by classical philosophy than the
words of the Framers. See Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Re-
publican Justifications for Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 461-64 (1988).
218. In arguing for ratification of the Constitution in The Federalist No. 1, Alex-
ander Hamilton cautioned about too much concern for the individual because zeal for
individual rights is "a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism" than a
"zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 5
(Alexander Hamilton) (Gary Wills ed., 1982). This view was a common one among
the Framers. Rogers Smith reminds us that James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
saw individual liberties in context, there for the purpose of promoting "'moderation
and harmony' and hence 'the preservation of free government."' ROGERS M. SMITH,
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (1985).
219. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 183 n.1 (1979) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting in part) ("Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community is
in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is therefore intrinsic to
individual dignity. This is particularly so in a democracy like our own, in which the
autonomy of each individual is accorded equal and incommensurate respect."); First
Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
("Ideas which are not a product of individual choice are entitled to less First Amend-
ment protection."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (to "assure self-
fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought, free from government censorship.").
220. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life
is an experiment . . . . While that experiment is part of our system I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an im-
mediate check is required to save the country."); ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941) ("The First Amendment protects ... a social
interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest
course of action but carry it out in the wisest way . . . . Truth can be sifted out from
falsehood only if the government is vigorously and constantly cross-examined").
688 [Vol. 77
ALL THOSE LIKE YOU
neither distorting the citizenry's discussion of important issues nor favoring
certain viewpoints or forms of expression.221 Therefore, rather than training
students in civic virtue and political literacy, liberal public education is meant
to teach "independence and vigor . . . in this relatively permissive, often dis-
putatious, society."222 And, though no one doubts that the public school is a
unique environment, liberal values of free expression have formed a signifi-
cant part of the Court's student speech jurisprudence. In Keyishian v. Board
223
of Regents, Justice Brennan called the classroom a "marketplace of
ideas." 224 Unlike the Founders and early American thinkers who saw the
success of the American experiment dependent upon a virtuous and public
service-oriented citizenry educated in shared values,225 Justice Brennan ech-
oed liberal scholarship that pinned American hopes on "leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
out of a multitude of tongues."226 The former emphasizes civic virtue; the
latter reflects the primacy of individual autonomy. In Tinker, the Court called
student speech a "hazardous freedom" because of the openness that Justice
Brennan's marketplace implied;227 in fact, any dissent is hazardous:
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that de-
viates from the views of another person may start an argument ....
But our Constitution says we must take this risk.228
We must take that risk because, under the liberal vision, the First
Amendment ensures our exposure to a broad range of ideas, unfiltered
221. This view is widely held. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track
Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
921, 932-933, 939, 945 (1993) (arguing that the First Amendment's core is the idea
that the government should not make policy based on the effects of speech); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) ("First Amendment law ...
has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives."); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
769, 786 (2001) (arguing that free speech cases ask one thing: whether the govern-
ment acted with an impermissible anti-speech motive); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 202-07 (1983)
(suggesting, in part, that the content neutrality principle is based on the desire for
equality among speakers).
222. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
223. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
224. Id. at 603.
225. See supra Part V.B.
226. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (internal quotes omitted).
227. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
228. Id.
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through some extrinsic conception of social good like "virtue" or "patriot-
ism."
Although we could foster a free market through deregulation, i.e., per-
mitting all types of speech, we do not because some restrictions on harmful
229 230 231
speech - true threats, fighting words, low value speech, for example -
enhance the vitality of the marketplace. The same is true with the regulation
of identity-based aggression in schools. As discussed above, such behavior is
antithetical to a free exchange of ideas because it silences minorities, instills
fear, chills the speech of victims and all those who identify with them, and
teaches and legitimizes inequality and discrimination.232 Punishing identity-
based harassment, then, would allow traditionally harassed minorities to
speak their minds, widening the ideas in the marketplace. After all, free
speech means nothing if you cannot speak in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tolerating identity-based aggression in schools not only ignores the
devastating effects such behavior has on its victims, it also ignores far-
reaching effects such behavior has on all those who share the same core, iden-
tifying characteristics of the victim. Only an absolutist conception of the
First Amendment would protect speech that targets students in this way, but
that vision is utterly inconsistent with a Supreme Court's student speech ju-
risprudence. Reflecting both Aristotelian and liberal educational values, that
jurisprudence is concerned with the effect certain student speech may have on
the school's ability to teach its students successfully.
Critics may argue that the central problem with this approach is that ef-
fects can vary and, in certain cases, conduct or expression that may damage
the fabric of one school may conform to the accepted social norms of another.
This is really two critiques in one. First, it reflects the traditional liberal view
that the arms of the state should refrain from making value judgments, allow-
ing their citizens to live the good life as they see fit; second, when the sur-
vival of student speech is left to an effects determination made by local fac-
ulty and administrators, the results may not always be progressive, inclusive,
and tolerant of minorities. A school in a conservative district with a popula-
tion that overwhelmingly disapproves of gay rights and homosexuality, in
general, may consider a Gay Pride t-shirt, a rainbow flag, or a speech in favor
229. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam).
230. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
231. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 282-83 (1992) (The First Amend-
ment permits "restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which
are 'of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."' (quot-
ing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
232. See supra notes 81-123 and accompanying text.
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of the freedom to marry wholly inappropriate, vulgar, or even a violation of
traditionalists' religious freedom. This is no theoretical possibility: principals
have removed students from assemblies for trying to speak on behalf of mar-
riage freedom233 and conservatives are pushing for laws that even allow bul-
lies to harass other students in accordance with some perverse interpretation
234
of religious doctrine. In those cases, traditionalists argue that their ability to
teach in a supportive environment is undermined by the forced imposition of
a disruptive outside culture.
Setting aside the provincialism and closed-mindedness that makes that
argument anathematic to education, in general, this is precisely why my the-
ory is necessary. Gay pride t-shirts, rainbow flags, and other similar non-
violent symbols or expressions of identity affirmation from other minority
groups are qualitatively different than expression that manifests the hate
members of a majority have for those minorities. Indeed, they are inverses.
And, it is not only theoretically impossible for in-group members to experi-
ence the same effects from out-group expressions of identity affirmation as
those minorities experience from hate and harassment directed at them. Rig-
orous sociological and psychological studies prove as much. This suggests
that there is ample sociological and legal support for allowing the judiciary to
make the objective assessment that identity-based harassment is inconsistent
with public education without sweeping identity-affirming expression out
with the trash.
233. Tracy Wood, Administrator Apologizes for Pulling Gay Student from Stage,
VOICE OF OC (Apr. 10, 2012), http://voiceofoc.org/countywide/thisjust
in/article f5 1f86da-7e9b- lel-8fda-001a4bcf887a.html.
234. Laura Hibbard, Michigan's 'Matt's Safe School Law' Allows Bullying with
Religious, Moral Reason, HUFFINGTON POST, (Nov. 4, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/04/michigans-matts-safe-schools-law-
allows-bullyingn_1076494.html. The religious exception was ultimately dropped
from the bill. Michigan's 'Matt's Safe School Law,' Anti-Bullying Legislation, Ex-
emption Dropped by Senator, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/14/matts-safe-school-law-exemption-
dropped n_1093667.html.
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